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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

CIRCULAR DEFINITIONS OF WHAT CONSTITUTES AN
EMPLOYEE: DETERMINING WHETHER THE PARTNERS OF
SIDLEY AUSTIN BROWN & WOOD QUALIFY AS EMPLOYERS OR
EMPLOYEES UNDER FEDERAL LAW

INTRODUCTION
Federal employment discrimination statutes1 are aimed at providing
protection to “employees.”2 However, the statutes fall short of providing clear
guidance as to what constitutes an employee.3 The definitional provisions of
most statutes utilize inadequate and ambiguous language.4 For example, the
Americans with Disabilities Act, Title VII, and the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act all contain similar ambiguous and circular definitions.5 All

1. There are a number of federal laws prohibiting employment discrimination, including the
following: (1) Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits job discrimination based
on an individual’s religion, sex, race, color, or national origin, (2) the Equal Pay Act of 1963
(EPA), which protects from sex-based discrimination, (3) the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967 (ADEA), which protects individuals who are forty and older from job-related
discrimination, (4) Title I and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA),
which protects individuals with disabilities that work for private companies or for state and local
government from employment discrimination, (5) Sections 501 and 505 of the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973, which prohibits discrimination against people with disabilities who work for the federal
government, and (6) the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which allows for monetary damages in
instances of intentional job discrimination.
See U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, Federal Laws Prohibiting Job Discrimination: Questions and Answers (May 24,
2002), http://www.eeoc.gov/facts/qanda.html.
2. Stephen M. Olson & Jeremy A. Mercer, Employment Law, Physician-Shareholders and
Law or Accounting Partners—Are They Employers or Employees?, K & L ALERT (Kirkpatrick &
Lockhart LLP, Boston, Mass.), April 2003. The Acts apply to “employers” with a stated
minimum number of employees. Id. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5) (2000), a business or
entity must employ a minimum of fifteen employees in order to qualify as an “employer.”
3. See Whether Partners are ‘Employees’, WASH., D.C. EMP. L. LETTER (Washington,
D.C.), Mar. 2003. Provisions defining “employer” and “employee” are difficult to understand in
many of the Acts. The Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) defines
“employee” as “any individual employed by an employer.” E.R.I.S.A., Pub. L. No. 93-406, §
3(6), 88 Stat. 833, 834 (1974). The Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) and the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA) also use the very same definition. See 29 U.S.C. § 2611(3) (2000); 29
U.S.C. § 203(e)(1) (2000).
4. See 29 U.S.C. § 2611(3) (2000); 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1) (2000).
5. Kristin Nicole Johnson, Resolving the Title VII Partner-Employee Debate, 101 MICH. L.
REV. 1067, 1070–71 (2003).
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three statutes define employee as “an individual employed by an employer.”6
Lack of clarity among the statutes makes it difficult to determine whether
individuals should be treated as employees or employers under various
circumstances. Furthermore, such vague definitions leave many questions as
to what factors actually determine one’s status as an employee.
Should lawyers who serve as partners in a law firm always be considered
employers, thereby barred from the protection of employment discrimination
laws? This question is not easily answered. Modern law firms present courts
with a unique problem: the difficulty of delineating between those who are
afforded protection under the federal anti-discrimination statutes (employees)
and those who are not (employers).7 In order to effectively answer this
question, courts need to reexamine and expand traditional notions of who is a
covered employee under the federal anti-discrimination acts.
It is important for courts to establish a uniform standard to determine what
factors qualify an individual as an employee because many circuits are split on
how to reach this conclusion.8 Many different tests exist, each with
particularized criteria.9 Further, it is important to have a proper understanding
of who qualifies as an employee because it will determine who may bring a
cause of action under the federal anti-discrimination acts.10 Therefore, it is
time to solidify and determine what factors constitute an employer and an
employee.
In Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Sidley Austin Brown &
Wood,11 the Seventh Circuit opened the door to the possibility that equity
partners in a law firm may be considered employees and may therefore be
afforded protection under federal anti-discrimination statutes.12 Regardless of
the final outcome, the decision in Sidley will likely “send shock waves through
law firm executive committees” nationwide and will have a lasting effect on

6. Id.; see Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(f) (2000); A.D.E.A., 29 U.S.C. § 630(f) (2000);
A.D.A., 42 U.S.C. § 12111(4) (2000). Courts treat Title VII, the ADEA, and the ADA “as
standing in pari passu and endorse the practice of treating judicial precedents interpreting one
such statute as instructive in decisions involving another.” Serapion v. Martinez, 119 F.3d 982,
985 (1st Cir. 1997); see also Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 756 (1979).
7. Catherine Lovly & Matthew J. Mehnert, Something Every Lawyer Needs to Know: The
Employer-Employee Distinction in the Modern Law Firm, 21 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 663,
664 (2004).
8. Id. at 665–66.
9. Id.
10. Peter J. Prettyman, How to Discriminate Against Old Lawyers: The Status of Partners,
Shareholders, and Members Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act With Addendum
Discussing Clackamas Gastroenterology Associates, P.C. v. Wells, 37 IND. L. REV. 545, 546
(2004).
11. EEOC v. Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, 315 F.3d 696 (7th Cir. 2002).
12. Employment Bibliography Roundup of Select Articles for Employment Practitioners,
EMP. L. STRATEGIST (ALM Law Journal Newsletters, Phila., Pa.), Dec. 2002.
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how law firms are managed.13 It appears likely that courts will adopt the
analysis of the Supreme Court’s 2003 Clackamas Gastroenterology Associates,
P.C. v. Wells decision and use the common law right of control test to resolve
the issue of whether partners may be considered employees.14 Law firm
partners that do not possess substantial control and decision-making power
within their firms should be considered employees and should be protected
under the federal anti-discrimination statutes. Therefore, the thirty-two
demoted partners at Sidley should be considered employees and should be
protected under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.15
This Casenote examines whether partners of a law firm should be protected
by federal anti-discrimination statutes, or in the alternative, whether partners
should be barred from suing for discrimination because they are employers.
Part I of this Note sets forth the facts, history, and holding of the Supreme
Court’s decision in Clackamas. Part I also explains various tests established
by the Supreme Court and the circuit courts to determine what constitutes
one’s status as an employee. Part II describes the facts of the Sidley case, the
common law control test, and cases following the Clackamas decision. Part III
analyzes the Sidley case and the common law control test. Part III also
discusses why the Sidley decision matters. Particularly, the analysis of this
Note focuses on the outcome and implications of Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission v. Sidley Austin Brown & Wood and any impact the
decision may have on the infrastructure of law firms in America.
I. THE PRECEDENTS
A.

Clackamas Gastroenterology Associates, P.C. v. Wells

In the 2003 Clackamas decision, the Supreme Court utilized the common
law agency control test to determine who qualifies as an employee under the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).16 Along with the control test, the
Supreme Court used the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s
(EEOC) guideline factors to resolve the issue of whether partners may be
considered employees.17

13. Id.
14. See generally Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440 (2003)
(finding that the common law right of control test and the EEOC guideline factors should be used
to make the employer/employee distinction).
15. The congressional purpose behind the ADEA is to protect individuals forty and over
from job-related discrimination. A.D.E.A., 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (2000). Further, the Act aims to
protect against discrimination between individuals protected by the Act. See A.D.E.A., 29 U.S.C.
§ 630(f) (2000).
16. Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 449.
17. See id. at 451.
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In Clackamas, the Supreme Court acknowledged that federal antidiscrimination statutes, including the ADA, provide nominal and circular
definitions of what constitutes an employee.18 In an attempt to remedy this
problem, the Court set forth a control test to determine who qualifies as an
employee.19 The Court stated that when Congress used the term employee
without defining it, “Congress intended to describe the conventional masterservant relationship as understood by common-law agency doctrine.”20 At
common law, the master-servant relationship focused on the master’s control
over the servant.21
In Clackamas, there was a question as to whether four physicians,
directors, and shareholders of a medical clinic were employers or employees.22
The Court faced a difficult decision. Certain factors supported the conclusion
that the physicians were employers.23 For example, the physicians controlled
the operation of the clinic, shared the clinic’s profits, and were liable for
medical malpractice claims.24 However, evidence on the record also supported
the conclusion that the physicians were employees.25 For example, the record
demonstrated that the physicians earned annual salaries, complied with the
standards and rules set by the clinic, and reported to a superior.26
The plaintiff, a terminated employee, advocated that the Court determine
whether the physicians were employees by asking whether they were
“partners.”27 The Court rejected this approach, concluding that “[t]oday there
are partnerships that include hundreds of members, some of whom may well
qualify as ‘employees’ because control is concentrated in a small number of
managing partners.”28

18. Id. at 444.
19. Id. at 449–50. The Court was persuaded by the EEOC’s focus on the common law
element of control. Id. at 449. The common law definition of control examines the masterservant relationship, specifically, the master’s control over the servant. Id. at 448.
20. Id. at 445 (quoting Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 322–23 (1992)).
21. Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 448. The Court noted that “‘servant’ . . . refers to a person
whose work is controlled or is subject to the right to control by the master.” Id. (citing THE
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2(2) (1957)). “A servant is a person employed to perform
services in the affairs of another and who with respect to the physical conduct in the performance
of the services is subject to the other’s control or right to control.” Id. (citing THE RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(1) (1957)).
22. Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 442.
23. Id. at 451.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 451 n.11.
27. Clarkamas, 538 U.S. at 445. The plaintiff advocated this approach rather than the
common law approach. Id.
28. Clarkamas, 538 U.S. at 446; see also Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 79
(1984) (Powell, J., concurring).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2007]

CIRCULAR DEFINITIONS OF WHAT CONSTITUTES AN EMPLOYEE

1333

With nothing but past precedent to work from, the Court turned to the
EEOC for guidance.29 The EEOC employs a six-factor test to consider the
question of whether an individual is subject to an organization’s control.30 The
non-exhaustive list contains the following:
1) Whether the organization can hire or fire the individual or establish rules
and regulations of the individual’s work; 2) Whether and, if so, to what extent
the organization supervises the individual’s work; 3) Whether the individual
reports to someone higher in the organization; 4) Whether and, if so, to what
extent the individual is able to influence the organization; 5) Whether the
parties intended that the individual be an employee, as expressed in written
agreements or contracts; 6) Whether the individual shares in the profits, losses,
31
and liabilities of the organization.

Under the EEOC approach, particular titles, such as “partner,” “shareholder,”
or “manager” are inadequate as a means to determine whether a person is, or is
not, an employer.32 To the contrary, the EEOC approach considers all
pertinent factors and occurrences involved in a relationship before determining
whether an individual is an employee.33
The Court was persuaded by the EEOC’s six-factor test which analyzed
said factors and focused on the common law touchstone of control.34 The
Court reasoned that all incidents in an employment relationship should be
analyzed when making a determination of an individual’s status as an
employer or employee, and that no one factor should be decisive.35
In adopting the approach advocated by the EEOC, the Court concluded
that courts should examine how a company or organization treats an individual
when determining whether federal discrimination statutes are applicable to that

29. Lovly & Mehnert, supra note 7, at 671.
30. Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 449–50. The EEOC’s six-factor inquiry lists several factors
relevant to determining an individual’s status as an employee. Courts look to the six factors when
deciding coverage of partners, officers, members of boards or directors, and major shareholders.
Craig A. Crispin, Clackamas Gastroenterology v. Wells, An Assessment by Craig A. Crispin,
Counsel for Wells 5–6 (American Bar Association Annual Meeting Paper, 2003), available at
http://www.bna.com/bnabooks/ababna/annual/2003/crispin.doc.
The
EEOC’s
approach
emphasizes that a person’s title or rank, such as partner or director, should not automatically
remove an individual from the Act’s coverage. Id. at 5. The EEOC’s main goal is to protect
individuals who are vulnerable to the kinds of treatment that the anti-discrimination statutes are
intended to prohibit. Id. at 4.
31. Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 449–50 (quoting EEOC Compliance Manual § 605:0009).
32. Olson & Mercer, supra note 2.
33. Id.
34. Id.; see also Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
35. Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 451.
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individual.36 Courts need to look beyond labels and corporate form to analyze
whether an individual manages and operates the business or, alternatively,
whether the individual is controlled by the business.37 Overall, the Court ruled
that that the “employer” is the entity that owns, manages, and operates the
business.38 The Court emphasized that determining whether an individual is an
employer or an employee requires an analysis that looks past the individual’s
title and beyond the title of the organization.39
The Court reached its conclusion in Clackamas after carefully analyzing
different tests and methods used to make the employer/employee distinction.
Therefore, case law leading up to the decision inevitably impacted the Court’s
ruling.
B.

Supreme Court History Leading to Clackamas

Prior to Clackamas, the Supreme Court had first addressed the
partner/employee controversy in its 1984 decision Hishon v. King &
Spalding.40 In Hishon, the Supreme Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit and
held that when an associate is being considered for partner, the associate
qualifies as an employee for the purposes of Title VII.41
Petitioner Elizabeth Anderson Hishon alleged that King & Spalding had
promised to consider her for partner on a fair and equal basis.42 Hishon further
alleged that the firm rejected her for admission to the partnership on the basis
of her sex, in violation of Title VII.43 Hishon asserted that King & Spalding’s
acts were covered under Title VII because she was denied a term, condition, or
privilege of employment.44 Hishon further alleged that King & Spalding used
the possibility of partnership to entice her into accepting an associate
position.45
The Court held that if Hishon’s allegations that the firm had promised to
consider her for partnership fairly and equally were proven, partnership
consideration was a term, condition, or privilege of her employment contract
and, therefore, was governed by Title VII.46 The Court further determined that
36. Timothy M. Singhel, Supreme Court Broadens Class of “Employees” Subject to the
Federal Antidiscrimination Laws (Holland & Knight LLP, Atlanta, Ga.), EMP., LAB. & BENEFITS
(June 2003).
37. See id.
38. See Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 450; see also Singhel, supra note 36.
39. See Singhel, supra note 36. Specifically, the lower courts will be required to evaluate
the six factors established by the EEOC. Id.
40. 467 U.S. 69 (1984).
41. Id. at 77.
42. Id. at 71–72.
43. Id. at 72.
44. Id. at 73–74.
45. Hishon, 467 U.S. at 71.
46. Id. at 75.
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Hishon likely had a cognizable claim under Title VII because the benefit of
partnership consideration appeared to have been directly linked to an
associate’s status as an employee.47 The Court noted in its decision that
employers may not evade Title VII by labeling employees partners.48
In the 1992 decision, Nationwide Mutual v. Darden,49 the Supreme Court
recognized that the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(ERISA) provided a nominal and circular definition of the term employee.50
The Court concluded that when Congress uses the term “employee” and does
not define it, Congress intends to describe the conventional master-servant
relationship as understood by common law agency doctrine.51 Under the
common law agency approach, the following factors help determine whether a
party is an employee:
[(1)] the hiring party’s right to control the [production of the
product;] . . . [(2)] the skill required; [(3)] the source of the
instrumentalities and tools; [(4)] the location of the work; [(5)] the
duration of the relationship between the parties; [(6)] whether the
hiring party has the right to assign additional projects to the hired party;
[(7)] the extent of the hired party’s discretion over when and how long
to work; [(8)] the method of payment; [(9)] the hired party’s role in
hiring and paying assistants; [(10)] whether the work is part of the
regular business of the hiring party; [(11)] whether the hiring party is in
business; [(12)] the provision of employee benefits; and [(13)] the tax
treatment of the hired party.52
The aforementioned list of factors is not exhaustive.53 Under the common law
agency approach, all incidents of a relationship must be analyzed because no
one factor is decisive and courts must look at all factors surrounding the
circumstances.54
Supreme Court decisions prior to Clackamas did not provide clear
guidance for circuit courts regarding how to make the employer/employee
distinction. As a result, circuit courts established different approaches to
resolve the question of what constitutes an employee.

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id. at 76.
Id. at 77.
503 U.S. 318 (1992).
Id. at 323.
Id. at 322–23.
Id. at 323–24.
Id. at 324.
Nationwide Mutual, 503 U.S. at 324.
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C. Circuit Splits
Circuit courts have addressed the employer/employee issue by utilizing a
number of different tests.55 These tests set the stage for the Clackamas
decision and gave the Supreme Court a number of approaches from which to
choose. For example, the Tenth Circuit utilized the “total bundle” approach in
order to determine whether a partner was an employee.56 Under this approach,
courts look at the total bundle of partnership characteristics in making a
determination.57
The Eleventh Circuit “look[ed] to the particular
circumstances of the case at hand and, in so doing,” focused “not on any label,
but on the actual role played by the claimant in the operations of the involved
entity and the extent to which that role dealt with traditional concepts of
management, control, and ownership.”58
Some courts use specific tests to determine what constitutes an employer.
For example, the Ninth Circuit59 has utilized the “economic realities” or “right
of control test.”60 Under this approach, courts look at factors including:
compensation, claimant’s liability for the company’s losses, management
structure of the company, and the claimant’s role in management.61
Another type of test that several circuit courts have embraced is the hybrid
test.62 Under this approach, courts combine the “common law agency” test and
the “economic realities” test.63 Under this approach, the main factors the
courts evaluate are: (1) the partner’s ownership in the company, (2) the
partner’s managerial power, (3) the partner’s compensation, (4) the partner’s
job security, and (5) the partner’s liability for firm losses.64

55. See Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 442–44 (2003).
56. See Wheeler v. Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257, 276 (10th Cir. 1987).
57. See id.
58. Fountain v. Metcalf, Zima & Co., 925 F.2d 1398, 1400–01 (11th Cir. 1991).
59. See Strother v. S. Cal. Permanente Med. Group, 79 F.3d 859, 867 (9th Cir. 1996).
60. Leonard Bierman, So, You Want to be a Partner at Sidley & Austin?, 40 HOUS. L. REV.
969, 992 (2003).
61. Id.
62. See, e.g., Drescher v. Shatkin, 280 F.3d 201, 203 (2d Cir. 2002); Serapion v. Martinez,
119 F.3d 982, 990 (1st Cir. 1997); Devine v. Stone, Leyton & Gershman, P.C., 100 F.3d 78, 81
(8th Cir. 1996); Simpson v. Ernst & Young, 100 F.3d 436, 443–44 (6th Cir. 1996); Hyland v.
New Haven Radiology Assocs., P.C., 794 F.2d 793, 797 (2d Cir. 1986); Hickey v. Arkla Indus.,
Inc., 699 F.2d 748, 751–52 (5th Cir. 1983); Goudeau v. Dental Health Servs., Inc., 901 F. Supp.
1139, 1143–44 (M.D. La. 1995); Vick v. Foote, Inc., 898 F. Supp. 330, 333–34 (E.D. Va. 1995),
aff’d, 82 F.3d 411 (4th Cir. 1996); Jones v. Baskin, Flaherty, Elliot and Mannino, P.C., 670 F.
Supp. 597, 602 (W.D. Pa. 1987), aff’d, 897 F.2d 522 (3d Cir. 1990) (without opinion); see also
Lovly & Mehnert, supra note 7, at 681.
63. Lovly & Mehnert, supra note 7, at 681.
64. See id. at 682–87.
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In the 1977 Burke v. Friedman65 decision, the Seventh Circuit, interpreting
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, classified partners as possible
“persons” that can act as an employer.66 The court analyzed whether four
defendant partners of an accounting firm could be considered employees.67
The four partners had part ownership in the firm and wholly operated the
firm.68 In addition, the partners were responsible for hiring and firing, and
made the final decision to fire plaintiff Barbara Burke.69 The court adopted a
per se rule as it relates to partners and concluded that where partners own and
manage the operation of a business, they cannot be considered employees.70
The court held that the equity partners of the accounting firm were employers
under Title VII.71
In the 1996 Sixth Circuit decision Simpson v. Ernst & Young,72 the court
applied the hybrid test.73 The Appellee (Simpson) was an accountant that was
terminated by Ernst & Young, a large accounting company, after a merger.74
Simpson brought suit under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act75
(ADEA) and ERISA, and brought a supplemental state claim.76 Ernst &
Young argued that Simpson was a partner rather than an employee and that,
therefore, the action was not cognizable under the ADEA or ERISA.77
Ernst & Young, in a matter of eighteen months, terminated 120 partners
over the age of forty, while admitting 162 new partners under the age of

65. 556 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1977).
66. Id. at 869. Title VII defines an employer in part as “a person engaged in an industry
affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty
or more calendar year weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such a
person . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2000).
67. Burke, 556 F.2d at 868–69. Pursuant to Title VII, “employee” is defined not as a
“person” but rather as “an individual employed by an employer.” 42 U.S.C § 2000e(f) (2000).
The Seventh Circuit analyzed whether a partner can be considered an employee under 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e(f). Burke, 556 F.2d at 868.
68. Burke, 556 F.2d at 869.
69. Id.
70. Id.; Lovly & Mehnert, supra note 7, at 677–78.
71. Burke, 556 F.2d at 869–70.
72. 100 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 1996).
73. Id. at 443. The hybrid test is a combination of the common law control test and
economic realities test. See id.
74. Id. at 438–39.
75. The ADEA covers private employers, state and local government, and employment
agencies that employ twenty or more persons. Crispin, supra note 30, at 2. In order for an
individual to support a prima facie case of an ADEA violation, he must prove he “lost out
because of his age.” Simpson, 100 F.3d at 444 (citing O’Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers,
517 U.S. 308, 311 (1996)). Additionally, courts must find that age was a “determining factor” in
a person’s discharge or demotion and that such an act was willful. Id.
76. Simpson, 100 F.3d at 439.
77. Id.
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forty.78 Simpson was replaced by a partner under the age of forty.79 Although
Simpson was given the title “partner,” the firm’s business, assets, and affairs
were directed exclusively by a ten to fourteen member Management
Committee.80 Simpson had no significant management control, no meaningful
voting rights, no fiduciary relationship, and no job security.81 Simpson was not
a bona fide partner by any stretch of the imagination.82 “For all practical
purposes, [Simpson] was an employee with the additional detriment of having
promised to be liable for the firm’s losses.”83
The trial judge concluded that Simpson was an “employee” for the
purposes of ADEA, ERISA, and Ohio state law.84 Further, the trial court
entered judgment for Simpson on his ERISA claim, concluding that his
discharge was in retaliation for persistent requests concerning his retirement
benefits.85 The jury returned a verdict in favor of Simpson on his ADEA
claim, finding that age was a “determining factor” in Simpson’s discharge and
that his termination was “willful.”86 The jury awarded past earnings, past
benefits, future earnings, and future benefits.87 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.88
Although these cases all established important tests that assuredly
influenced the Clackamas decision, the cases in Part III.C. of this Note, infra,
have applied Clackamas and demonstrate the effectiveness of the Clackamas
decision.
III. SIDLEY SHOULD BE EVALUATED USING THE CLACKAMAS CONTROL TEST
A.

The Facts of Sidley

In 1999, Sidley & Austin89 demoted thirty-two of its equity partners after
implementing a retirement policy which changed the mandatory retirement age
for partners from sixty-five to a discretionary age for any partner who was

78. Id. at 441.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Simpson, 100 F.3d at 441.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 442.
84. Id. at 439.
85. Id. at 440.
86. Simpson, 100 F.3d at 439.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 444.
89. On May 1, 2001, Sidley & Austin merged with Brown & Wood. EEOC v. Sidley &
Austin, No. 01-C-9635, 2002 WL 206485, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 11, 2002). The firm is now
known as Sidley Austin Brown & Wood. Id.
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between the ages of sixty and sixty-five.90 Thirty of the thirty-two demoted
partners were over the age of forty.91 An executive committee made the
decision and demoted the thirty-two partners to “counsel” or “senior
counsel.”92 The EEOC93 instituted an investigation to determine whether the
demotions had anything to do with age.94 The EEOC filed suit against Sidley
based on the firm’s practice of demoting or forcing older partners into
retirement.95 “In its complaint, the [EEOC] charged that [Sidley] violated the
ADEA by ‘maintaining and implementing, since at least 1978, an age-based
retirement policy.’”96
Under the ADEA, only employees are protected from discrimination.97 In
response to the EEOC’s allegations, Sidley asserted that the ADEA did not
apply to the thirty-two partners because they were employers and not
To determine whether the partners were employers or
employees.98
employees, the EEOC requested a subpoena duces tecum.99 The EEOC sought
documents from Sidley, including information regarding coverage100 under the
ADEA and discrimination.101

90. Id.
91. Id.
92. EEOC v. Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, 315 F.3d 696, 698–99 (7th Cir. 2002).
93. The EEOC enforces the federal statutes that prohibit employment discrimination. U.S.
Equal Opportunity Commission, supra note 1. Further, the EEOC provides guidance and
oversight over federal equal employment opportunities guidelines and procedures. Id. The
EEOC has offered guidance to determine when partners and shareholders should be regarded as
employees for the purposes of the federal anti-discrimination statutes. Brief for the United States
and the EEOC as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner in Part, Clackamas Gastroenterology
Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440 (2003) (No. 01-1435), 2002 WL 31746517, at *8. The
EEOC has clearly established that a person’s title or rank does not determine whether that person
is a partner or a shareholder versus an employee. Id. at *8–9. One of the main factors the EEOC
analyzes to determine whether an individual is an employee is whether “the individual is subject
to the organization’s control” or “whether the individual acts independently and participates in
managing the organization.” Id. at *9.
94. Sidley, 315 F.3d at 698.
95. Anthony Lin, EEOC Sues Sidley Austin Alleging Age Discrimination, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 14,
2005, at 1.
96. Id.
97. Sidley, 315 F.3d at 698.
98. Id. at 698–99.
99. Id. at 698. A “subpoena duces tecum” is “[a] subpoena ordering the witness to appear
and to bring specified documents, records, or things.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1467 (8th ed.
2004).
100. The EEOC sought documentation to determine whether the thirty-two partners were
covered by the ADEA. Sidley, 315 F.3d at 698. In order for the thirty-two partners to be covered
under the ADEA, the EEOC would have to show that they were employees prior to their
demotion. Id.
101. Id.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

1340

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 51:1329

Particularly, the EEOC sought information regarding the employment
status of the demoted partners, information pertaining to how the new
retirement plan was developed, and the rationale for the demotions.102 Sidley
presented a jurisdictional argument, asserting that its partners were not subject
to EEOC regulation and refused to provide the EEOC with all of the requested
information.103 Sidley argued that the EEOC had no jurisdiction because a
partner is considered an employer under the ADEA if “(a) his income included
a share of the firm’s profits, (b) he made a contribution to the capital of the
firm, (c) he was liable for the firm’s debts, and (d) he has some administrative
or managerial responsibilities—and all these things, the firm argues, have been
proved.”104 Sidley asserted that the EEOC had no basis for the inquiry because
the thirty-two demoted individuals were “real” partners,105 and therefore not
covered under the federal statutes.106
102. Lovly & Mehnert, supra note 7, at 675. The EEOC further sought
names, dates of birth, hire and admission to partnership, current title, practice groups,
billing rates, hours billed and amounts collected for a several-year period, compensation
and evaluative materials, and dates and reasons for separation where applicable. With
respect to the 32 demoted partners, EEOC further seeks documentation for the reasons for
the change of status, the date the partner was informed and the partner’s subsequent fate.
Further, EEOC seeks information concerning retirement policies, formal or informal,
which have been in effect at Sidley since 1970 and information about all partners who
have retired under a retirement policy, including their compensation from two years
before retirement to the present.
EEOC v. Sidley & Austin, No. 01-C-9635, 2002 WL 206485, at *2 n.3 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 11, 2002).
103. Sidley, 315 F.3d at 698–99. Sidley defines a “true partner” as one that “contributes to
capital, shares in the profits, is subject to the liabilities of the partnership, and participates in
administration of the firm.” Sidley, 2002 WL 206485, at *3 n.7. However, the EEOC contends
that a number of additional factors “may add or detract from the core elements of [a] partnership.”
Id. Specifically, Sidley refused to provide a copy of the retirement plan, profiles of the partners,
and information regarding its past retirement policies. Id. at *2.
104. Sidley, 315 F.3d at 699.
105. Id. at 698–99. Although no statutory definition establishes what constitutes a “real”
partner, Section 541.1 of the Fair Labor Standards Act defines a “bona fide executive” as an
individual:
(a) Whose primary duty consists of the management of the enterprise in which he is
employed or of a customarily recognized department of subdivision thereof; and
(b) Who customarily and regularly directs the work of two or more other employees
therein; and
(c) Who has the authority to hire or fire other employees or whose suggestions and
recommendations as to the hiring or firing and as to the advancement and promotion or
any other change of status of other employees will be given particular weight; and
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The district court ordered Sidley to comply with the subpoena,
acknowledging that the Supreme Court has stated that the EEOC has the
authority to initiate an investigation for alleged violations of the ADEA.107
The court further held that “where jurisdictional [or] coverage facts are
incomplete, the court will enforce the subpoena.”108
Sidley appealed to the Seventh Circuit, again asserting that the EEOC
lacked jurisdiction to bring suit.109 The Seventh Circuit ordered Sidley to
comply with the subpoena to the extent that it sought information regarding
coverage and the applicability of the ADEA to the thirty-two partners.110 The
court remanded and ordered the district court to determine whether the thirtytwo partners were employers or employees, and thus, whether they were
covered under the ADEA.111
In Sidley, the court established that employers cannot evade antidiscrimination law simply by labeling employees “partners.”112 The court
questioned the legitimacy of Sidley’s claim that the thirty-two persons were
full-fledged partners.113 One of the reasons the court questioned the status of
the thirty-two as partners was the unequal distribution of power.114 At Sidley,
a self-perpetuating executive committee had the majority of the decisionmaking power.115 This committee, merely thirty-six of the over 500 Sidley
partners, had complete power over the hiring, firing, and demotion of the
thirty-two partners.116 In addition, any committee decisions made by the
thirty-two demoted partners were subject to the control of the executive
committee.117
The court’s decision to issue the subpoena demonstrates the court’s
willingness to conclude that under certain circumstances even individuals that

(d) Who customarily and regularly exercises discretionary powers; and
(e) Who does not devote more than 20 percent . . . [of his or her] workweek to activities
which are not directly and closely related to the performance of the work described . . . .
29 C.F.R. § 541.1 (2003); see Joel Bannister, Comment, In Search of a Title: When Should
Partners be Considered “Employees” for Purposes of Federal Employment Antidiscrimination
Statutes?, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 257, 272 (2004).
106. See Sidley, 2002 WL 206485, at *2.
107. Id. at *1 nn.2 & 4 (noting that the Supreme Court recognized this principle in Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 28 (1991)).
108. Id. at *2 n.5.
109. EEOC v. Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, 315 F.3d 696, 699 (7th Cir. 2002).
110. Id. at 707.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 709 (Easterbrook, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
113. See, e.g., id. at 703 (majority opinion).
114. Sidley, 315 F.3d at 702–03.
115. Id. at 699, 702–03.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 699.
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are labeled “partners” may, nevertheless, be employees for the purposes of
coverage under federal anti-discrimination laws. Currently, many courts,
including the Seventh Circuit, remain without a legitimate test to deal with the
issues presented in Sidley. Therefore, courts will likely look to the Supreme
Court, primarily Clackamas, for guidance.
B.

The Clackamas Common Law Control Test

In deciding Sidley, the district court should have applied the control test
established in Clackamas because it provides the only clear guidance from the
Supreme Court. Application of the control test should subdue some of the
confusion among the circuits regarding how to make the employer/employee
distinction. It appears that in the Clackamas decision, the Supreme Court
somewhat settled the circuit split by following the six-factor test established by
the EEOC.118 The six-factor test establishes guidelines to determine whether a
shareholder/director is an employee.119 Although the decision provides courts
with a better understanding of who qualifies as an employee for the purposes
of establishing liability under the federal anti-discrimination acts, the decision
allows for a fair amount of latitude in interpreting and applying the six
factors.120
Now, even though some guidance exists, there is still a lack of
predictability in applying the control test. Courts can interpret the six-factor
test broadly, narrowly, or as the court sees fit. Nevertheless, the guidance
provided by Clackamas gives all circuit courts a framework from which to
work and a standard to uphold. The EEOC guidance endorsed by the Supreme
Court in Clackamas will protect individuals “who, despite their titles, remain
vulnerable to the kinds of treatment prohibited by the [anti-discrimination
acts].”121 Accordingly, the guidance applies to partnerships and its partners as
well as to director/shareholders.122 The decision may not lead to predictable
results in all cases, but the decision will make the employer/employee
distinction easier to determine.
For example, after the Clackamas decision, it was established that
partnerships are not automatically exempt from coverage under the
employment discrimination statutes.123 Particularly, Clackamas established
that if an executive, partner, or shareholder is subject to an organization’s or
118. Supreme Court Settles Circuit Schism on the Issue of Shareholders and Directors as
“Employees” for the Purposes of Liability Under the Americans With Disabilities Act, GIBBONS,
July 9, 2003.
119. Id.
120. See id. Ambiguities brought about by the decision will inevitably leave some discretion
to judicial decision-makers. See Bannister, supra note 105, at 261–62.
121. Crispin, supra note 30, at 8.
122. Id.
123. Id.
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partnership’s control, then the person should be considered an employee and
not an employer.124 Therefore, in the Sidley case, it appears that the EEOC has
a compelling argument that the thirty-two partners were partners in title only
and that they should be protected under the federal anti-discrimination
statutes.125 Further, Clackamas established that the EEOC’s six-factor control
test should be applied in making the employer/employee distinction.126 The
control test furthers the policy goals of the anti-discrimination statutes by
compelling courts to apply a factors test on a case-by-case basis. In applying
the control test, the policy behind the anti-discrimination statues is furthered
because more people will be protected under the statues. Through application
of the test and through a totality of the circumstances analysis, courts will be
able to determine whether a particular plaintiff is in need of and entitled to
protection.
C. Cases Following the Clackamas Decision
It appears that the circuit courts are following the control test and EEOC
guidelines established in the 2003 Supreme Court Clackamas decision.
Nevertheless, there is no bright-line rule to determine the employer/employee
distinction; therefore each decision will be made on a case-by-case basis.
In the 2005 decision Solon v. Kaplan,127 the Seventh Circuit addressed the
question of whether a partner (Solon) of a law firm was an employee, for the
purposes of determining whether he was entitled to sue for retaliation under
Title VII.128 The record established that Solon was one of four general
partners and that he exercised substantial control over allocation of the firm’s
profits, partnership agreements, and dissolution of the firm.129 In addition,
Solon had hiring and firing powers, voting rights, and an equity interest in the
firm’s profits.130 The court applied the Clackamas control test.131 After
applying the control test, the court concluded that no reasonable juror could
find that Solon was an employee of the firm.132
In the 2004 decision Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp.,133 the Fifth Circuit utilized
the Clackamas control test in the court’s analysis of the district court’s

124. Id.
125. See id. at 5; see also U.S. Equal Opportunity Commission, supra note 1 (stating that age
discrimination in employment is prohibited by the ADEA).
126. Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 449–50 (2003).
127. 398 F.3d 629 (7th Cir. 2005).
128. Id. at 630.
129. Id. at 630–31, 633.
130. Id. at 633–34.
131. Id. at 633.
132. Solon, 398 F.3d at 633.
133. 380 F.3d 219 (5th Cir. 2004).
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opinion.134 In the district court, the plaintiff (Arbaugh), who had filed a sexual
harassment suit, argued that the owners of a restaurant and their wives were
employees under Title VII.135 On appeal, Arbaugh primarily argued that the
owners’ wives were employees of the restaurant.136 The court looked to the
following factors in reaching its conclusion: the wives were not designated as
employees, and the wives, along with their husbands, shared in the restaurant’s
profits, losses, and liabilities.137 The Fifth Circuit applied the six-factor control
test established in Clackamas to the facts of the case and concluded that the
district court reached the correct decision in finding that neither the owners of
the restaurant nor their wives were employees.138
Similarly, in the 2004 Second Circuit decision Rodal v. Anesthesia Group
of Onondaga, P.C.,139 the Clackamas control test was once again utilized.140
The Second Circuit remanded, finding that in light of the Clackamas decision,
discovery should be reopened.141 The court ordered the district court to
determine, through applying the six-factor Clackamas control test, whether a
doctor was an employee of an anesthesia group and thus entitled to the
protections of the ADA.142
IV. ANALYSIS: WHY THE THIRTY-TWO SIDLEY PARTNERS ARE EMPLOYEES
A.

The Sidley Case and the Control Test

Solon clearly demonstrates that the Seventh Circuit adheres to the
Clackamas control test in making the employer/employee distinction.
Therefore, in Sidley, upon remand by the Seventh Circuit, the district court will
most likely apply the control test in deciding the case. However, the outcome
in Sidley will probably be different from the outcome in Solon because the
facts in Sidley are easily distinguishable. For example, in Solon, the facts
clearly established that Solon had substantial power within the partnership on
all operational levels.143 Solon had control in areas ranging from hiring and
firing to monetary decisions.144 For these reasons, Solon was clearly an
employer under the control test. On the other hand, the questions in Sidley
134. Id. at 230.
135. Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., No. Civ.A. 01-3376, 2003 WL 1797893, at *1,*7 (E.D. La.
April 3, 2003).
136. Arbaugh, 380 F.3d at 229.
137. Id. at 230.
138. Id.
139. 369 F.3d 113 (2d Cir. 2004).
140. Id. at 123.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. See Solon v. Kaplan, 398 F.3d 629, 630–31 (7th Cir. 2005).
144. See id. at 630–31, 634.
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surround the balance of power and profit sharing of the thirty-two partners. In
addition, the record establishes that the thirty-two partners had very limited
voting rights and no voice in hiring or firing decisions.145 On a prima facie
case basis, the thirty-two partners in Sidley had much less power than the
partner in Solon.
Courts are embracing the common-law control test as the principal
guidepost in making the employer/employee distinction in employment
discrimination cases.146 Many factors in Sidley point to the conclusion that the
thirty-two partners did not possess sufficient authority to be considered
employers. Applying the six EEOC factors adopted in Clackamas, it appears
that the thirty-two partners were employees.
1.

Are the Individuals Supervised?

Courts must analyze whether and to what extent the organization
supervises the individual’s work.147 At Sidley, the thirty-two demoted
partners’ work was closely supervised by the law firm’s executive
committee.148 In Sidley, Judge Posner “pointed to the highly centralized
management of [Sidley], in which partners never voted on issues, and a selfselecting executive committee made all major decisions, in suggesting that the
partners could, in fact, be employees.”149 In addition to this unequal balance of
power, the executive committee oversaw all hiring, firing, promotions,

145. EEOC v. Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, 315 F.3d 696, 699, 702–03 (7th Cir. 2002).
146. But cf. Colangelo v. Motion Picture Projectionists, Operators & Video Technicians,
Local 110, No. 01-C-9417, 2004 WL 406770, *3 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 26, 2004) (distinguishing
Clackamas on the grounds that Clackamas dealt with a corporation and director-shareholders
rather than a union and its board members). However, according to EEOC guidance, which was
adopted by the Court in Clackamas, the same analysis that applies to corporation/directorshareholders applies to a partnership and its partners. See Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs.,
P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 450 (2003); Crispin, supra note 30, at 8.
147. Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 450. The EEOC advocated a six-factor test to consider the
question of whether an individual is subject to an organization’s control. The non-exhaustive list
contains the following: (1) “Whether and, if so, to what extent the organization supervises the
individual’s work,” (2) “Whether the individual reports to someone higher in the organization,”
(3) “Whether and, if so, to what extent the individual is able to influence the organization,” (4)
“Whether the parties intended that the individual be an employee, as expressed in written
agreements or contracts,” (5) “Whether the organization can hire or fire the individual, or
establish rules and regulations of the individual’s work,” and (6) “Whether the individual shares
in the profits, losses, and liabilities of the organization.” Id.
148. See Sidley, 315 F.3d at 699.
149. Lin, supra note 95. Judge Posner said, “[T]he question . . . is not whether Sidley is a
partnership; it is. The question is whether when, a firm employs the latitude allowed to it by state
law to reconfigure a partnership in the direction of making it a de facto corporation, a federal
agency enforcing federal antidiscrimination law is compelled to treat all the ‘partners’ as
employers.” Sidley, 315 F.3d at 705.
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demotions, and compensation.150 Inevitably, the committee monitored each
partner’s workload.151 Sidley scrutinized the work of the thirty-two partners,
and stated that the demotions were due to “shortcomings in performance.”152
Through making this statement, Sidley admitted to supervising the thirty-two
partners’ work.
2.

Do the Individuals Report to Someone Higher?

Courts must analyze whether the individuals report to someone higher in
the organization.153 The thirty-two partners were by no means autonomous. In
Sidley, the thirty-two partners had to answer to higher-level partners—the
members of the executive committee.154 None of the demoted partners were
on the all-powerful executive committee; the committee that decided to demote
the partners.155 In addition, any decisions made by the thirty-two partners were
subject to the veto power of the executive committee.156 At Sidley, the
partners always had someone higher looking over their shoulders.
The ADEA is inapplicable only to “a very few top level employees who
exercise substantial executive authority over a significant number of
employees and a large volume of business.”157 The ADEA is applicable in
Sidley because the stipulated facts demonstrate that the thirty-two demoted
partners were not top-level officials; they were subjected to the decisions of the
executive committee.158 Further, the ADEA is applicable in Sidley because the
demoted partners did not exercise significant control over firm business by any
stretch of the imagination.
3.

Do the Individuals Influence the Organization?

Courts must analyze whether the individuals were able to influence the
organization.159 In Sidley, the record clearly establishes that the thirty-two
partners had minimal if any influential power over decision-making.160 The
only inkling of power granted to the thirty-two partners was their ability to
serve on committees.161 All decisions reached by committees, however, were

150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Sidley, 315 F.3d at 699.
See id.
Id. at 698.
Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 450 (2003).
Sidley, 315 F.3d at 699, 702–03.
See id.
See id.
29 C.F.R. § 1625.12(d)(2) (2003).
See Sidley, 315 F.3d at 699.
Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 450 (2003).
See Sidley, 315 F.3d at 699.
Id.
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subject to the control of the executive committee.162 In addition, the partners
had no say whatsoever regarding their fate at the firm, no vote, and no voice.163
Their status at the firm was 100% in the hands of the thirty-six member
executive committee.164
Under the ADEA, individuals that play a significant role in the
development, recommendation, and implementation of corporate policy are
exempt from protection under the Act.165 However, the ADEA does protect
middle-management and individuals with moderate levels of control over the
business.166 At Sidley, the thirty-two partners at best had moderate levels of
control over the firm.
4.

Did the Parties Intend the Individuals to be Employees?

Courts must analyze whether the parties intended the individuals to be
employees.167 Clearly, Sidley intended, at least on paper, for the thirty-two
partners to be employers. However, the EEOC contends that even when an
individual signs a partnership agreement, if the individual lacks substantial
control over the business, the individual should be considered an employee.168
Further, the Supreme Court established in Clackamas that a firm cannot, by
affixing the label “partner” to someone who is functionally an employee, avoid
federal antidiscrimination law.169 The important point is that regardless of the
language of the partnership agreement, Sidley did not give the thirty-two
partners sufficient power to render them real partners; therefore they should be
considered employees.
5.

Could the Organization Hire or Fire the Individuals?

Courts must analyze whether the organization can hire or fire
individuals.170 At Sidley, the firm’s executive committee made decisions
regarding the hiring, firing, and promotion of partners and associates.171 The
record in Sidley clearly establishes that the thirty-two demoted partners had
little hiring and firing powers.172 In fact, on most employment issues, they
162. Id.
163. See id.
164. Id. at 699, 702–03.
165. See 29 C.F.R. § 1625.12(d) (2003).
166. Id.
167. Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 450 (2003).
168. A Rose by Any Other Name: Keeping Partners and Professional Shareholders From
Becoming Employees, EMP. L. BRIEFINGS (Sedgwick, Detert, Moran & Arnold LLP, Chi., Ill.),
Feb. 2005, available at http://www.sdma.com/Publications/detail.aspx?pub=4130 (select link to
“February 2005 (pdf)”) [hereinafter EMP. L. BRIEFINGS].
169. Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 449.
170. Id. at 450.
171. See EEOC v. Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, 315 F.3d 696, 699 (7th Cir. 2002).
172. See id.
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were not even given a vote. Most importantly, the hiring, firing, and demotion
of the thirty-two demoted partners was in the sole discretion of the executive
committee.173
6.

Do the Individuals Share in Profits and Losses?

Courts must analyze whether the individuals share in the profits, losses,
and liabilities of the organization.174 Even if the court determines that the
thirty-two demoted partners shared in the profits and losses of Sidley, this
factor alone is not decisive. In Sidley, one of the firm’s main arguments was
that the EEOC had no jurisdiction to bring suit on behalf of the thirty-two
partners because they were employers, not employees protected by the federal
anti-discrimination laws, for the following reasons: (1) they shared in the
firm’s profits, (2) they contributed to the capital of the firm, (3) they were
liable for the firm’s debts, and (4) they had some administrative
responsibilities.175 However, the EEOC maintains that even where an
individual has equity ownership, liability, and profit-sharing rights, to the
extent that the individual is subject to the supervision of another and has little
influence over business decisions, the individual should be considered an
employee.176 Further, under the Uniform Partnership Act (UPA),177 a
distinguishing characteristic of partnership is that partners share equally in
profits.178 In Sidley, the thirty-two partners’ profits were determined by the
executive committee.179 Therefore, profits were not distributed equally among

173. See id.
174. Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 450.
175. Sidley, 315 F.3d at 699.
176. EMP. L. BRIEFINGS, supra note 168.
177. Under the Uniform Partnership Act, common characteristics of a partnership include the
following:
(1) The partners share equally in profits and losses . . . ; (2) they have equal rights in the
management and conduct of the partnership business . . . ; (3) every partner is an agent of
the partnership, and entitled to bind the other partners by his acts, for the purpose of its
business . . . ; (4) all partners are liable for the debts of the partnership . . . ; (5) a fiduciary
relation exists between the partners . . . ; (6) all property brought into the partnership stock
is partnership property . . . ; (7) on dissolution the partnership is not terminated, but
continues until the winding up of partnership affairs is completed.
E.H. Schopflocher, Partnership as Distinguished from Employment, 137 A.L.R. 6 (2004)
(citations omitted).
178. Id.
179. Sidley, 315 F.3d at 699. The thirty-two partners’ incomes were “determined by the
number of percentage points of the firm’s overall profits that the executive committee assigned to
each of them.” Id.
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the partners, indicating that Sidley did not follow traditional guidelines of
partnership law.180
The control test balances all six factors in making a final determination as
to employment status. As the Court noted in Clackamas, “[t]oday there are
partnerships that include hundreds of members, some of whom may well
qualify as ‘employees’ because control is concentrated in a small number of
managing partners.”181 At Sidley, the title “partner” was a meaningless term
that attempted to bring about a false sense of distribution of power, when really
all the power was centralized in one body, the executive committee. This was
the case in Sidley, and the district court should hold that the thirty-two demoted
partners at Sidley are in fact employees due to their lack of control and
decision-making power.
B.

The Uniform Partnership Act Suggests the Partners are Employees

Recent revisions to the UPA may have an impact in determining whether
partners can be classified as employees with regard to the federal antidiscrimination statutes. The revised UPA, which has been adopted by a
majority of the states, includes some provisions that appear to support a
partner’s right to sue as an employee for discriminatory conduct.182 Under the
revised UPA, partners can sue a partnership and a partnership may sue a
partner.183 This opens the door to litigation and inevitably takes away the sting
that might otherwise come from allowing partners to sue on the basis of
180. If profits are received as wages, no proof of partnership is said to exist. See
Schopflocher, supra note 177. A party is not inferred to be a partner merely because he or she is
given profits as part of compensation for services. See id.
181. Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 446 (2003). The
term “partner” no longer “invokes reassuring connotations of equality” across the board. David
B. Wilkins, Partners Without Power? A Preliminary Look at Black Partners in Corporate Law
Firms, 2 J. INST. FOR STUDY LEGAL ETHICS 15, 16 (1999). In many law firms, some partners
clearly possess more power than others. Id. Many firms divide partners into two tiers, separating
them into either: (1) equity partners who divide the firm’s profits, or (2) non-equity partners who
are paid salaries. Geri S. Krauss, The Nitty-Gritty on Equity, LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 26, 2004. Even
in the firms that do have a unified partnership, as opposed to a two-tiered system, there are
discrepancies in compensation and control amongst partners. Id. The traditional “one person one
vote” regime that characterized the voting scheme of law firms of the past has been replaced with
firms that focus on each individual partner’s contribution to the bottom line. Id. In many firms
the partners that bring in the most clients and the most revenue receive the most profits and tend
to have more significant roles in the firm’s management and decision-making. Id.
182. Stephanie M. Greene & Christine Neylon O’Brien, Partners and Shareholders as
Covered Employees Under Federal Antidiscrimination Acts, 40 AM. BUS. L.J. 781, 784, 808
(2003).
183. Id. at 812. “This right to sue permits actions during the term of the partnership and does
not require dissolution in order to permit an action for an accounting. Neither does it require an
action for an accounting as a prerequisite to any suit.” Id. at n.147; see also UNIFORM
PARTNERSHIP ACT § 405(b) (1997).
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discrimination. The revised UPA allows partners to sue firms or partnerships
generally; therefore no logical reason exists to prohibit partners from suing on
the basis of discrimination.
Further, the revised UPA emphasizes the importance of the entity
theory.184 The Act states that under the entity theory, “a partnership is an
entity distinct from its partners.”185 The entity theory, by recognizing “partners
as distinct from the partnership,” increases the likelihood that a court will find
a partner to be a covered employee under federal anti-discrimination
statutes.186 The theory clearly separates a partner from a partnership, the
former as an individual, and the latter as a business. This important distinction
demonstrates the revised Act’s attempt to establish that partners possess
individual rights and are not definitively tied to the partnership.
C. Partners as Employees: The Pros & Cons
In organizations that employ hundreds of partners, the supposed “coowners of the company are, by necessity, so far removed from the seat of
actual power as to be subject to the reach” of the offensive acts that antidiscrimination law seeks to remedy.187 The Sidley decision may remedy this
problem to a certain extent, by establishing that so-called “partners” can sue on
the basis of discrimination in situations where partners lack significant control
over the firm.
There are arguments both for and against considering partners to be
employees. One argument against considering partners to be employees is that
partnership relations could be poisoned if partners are allowed to sue each
other for discrimination.188 However, conversely, partnership relationships
will be ruined if partners are subjected to disparate treatment and are forced to
bear discrimination without any hope of recourse.
Another argument against considering partners to be employees is that
because of Congress’s small business exception, partners of small businesses
would never be protected by anti-discrimination statutes.189 Therefore, the
184. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT Prefatory Note (1997). Although the revised UPA states
that the entity theory should be the dominant model with regard to partnerships, “[i]t should be
noted . . . that the aggregate approach, which views the partnership as a totality of persons rather
than an entity in itself, is . . . retained in [the revised UPA] for some purposes, such as partners’
joint and several liability.” See Greene & O’Brien, supra note 182, at 809.
185. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 201(a) (1997).
186. Greene & O’Brien, supra note 182, at 809.
187. Simpson v. Ernst & Young, 100 F.3d 436, 445 (6th Cir. 1996) (Daughtrey, J.,
concurring).
188. Robert W. Hillman, Law, Culture, and the Lore of Partnership: Of Entrepreneurs,
Accountability, and the Evolving Status of Partners, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 793, 822–23
(2005).
189. Lauren Winters, Partners Without Power: Protecting Law Firm Partners From
Discrimination, 39 U.S.F. L. REV. 413, 435 n.178 (2005). Congress enacted a small business
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protection of partners under the Acts would be a moot point, because a portion
of the population would be left unprotected.190 However, the small business
exception applies only to “really small businesses.”191 A nominal numbers of
partners work in very small firms.192 Therefore, allowing partners to be
considered employees protects the great majority of the country’s partners.
One of the main justifications for excluding partners from protection under
the anti-discrimination statutes is that partners have other mechanisms under
partnership law to protect themselves from disparate treatment.193 At Sidley,
however, none of the thirty-two demoted partners had a way to protect
themselves from the committee that decided to demote them.194 More
importantly, the thirty-two partners had no vote in the decision on their
demotion.195 The Sidley case is a perfect example of how partnership law
gives partners no effective remedy against oppression by their fellow partners.
Partners with little power or control, such as the thirty-two demoted
partners at Sidley, should be classified as employees and covered under federal
anti-discrimination statutes. Regardless of how Sidley is decided, the outcome
will likely impact how partnerships and executive committees operate their
businesses.
D. Why Sidley Matters
Under the status quo, promotion from associate to partner can leave
women, minorities, and older attorneys exposed to unlawful employment
practices.196 Women and minorities have historically been discriminated
against and excluded from partnership.197 Promotion of these groups may put
them in a position where they have no method of recourse if faced with
discrimination.198 In addition, older partners, often forced out when the
economy takes a turn for the worse, also lack a method of recourse to combat
Currently, partners in these types of
blatant age discrimination.199
predicaments are usually forced to weigh the economic benefits of partnership
exception to exempt small businesses from having to face suit under federal anti-discrimination
law. See id. The rationale behind this policy is that Congress intended “to spare very small firms
from the potentially crushing expense of mastering the intricacies of antidiscrimination laws,
establishing procedures to assure compliance, and defending against suits when efforts at
compliance fail.” Id. (citing Papa v. Katy Indus., Inc., 166 F.3d 937 (7th Cir. 1999)).
190. See id.
191. Id.
192. See id.
193. Id. at 419.
194. See EEOC v. Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, 315 F.3d 696, 699 (7th Cir. 2002).
195. See id.
196. Winters, supra note 189, at 419.
197. See id. at 435 n.177.
198. See id. at 419–20.
199. Firing Partners, 02-12 PARTNER’S REP. 4, Dec. 2002.
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against the professional perils of being subjected to harassment.200 Ultimately,
the partner has two choices: to leave the firm or to face harassment and
humiliation.201 However, this could all change. In Sidley, if the district court
applies the Clackamas control test broadly, future courts may be encouraged to
do the same.202 An expansive interpretation of the anti-discrimination acts
would protect vulnerable groups in need of protection—groups such as
women, minorities, and older attorneys.
Regardless of whether the district court decides to apply the Clackamas
control test narrowly, broadly, or at all, the court will need to determine what
type of authority the thirty-two demoted partners possessed. One possibility is
that the district court in Sidley will determine the thirty-two partners are
analogous to corporate executives, especially considering that in Sidley, the
Seventh Circuit likened the thirty-two partners’ authority to the authority
possessed by corporate executives, who are considered employees under
federal law.203 After all, partners and business executives share several
similarities including: (1) partners can commit a firm by writing opinion
letters, just as corporate executives can commit a business to contractual
obligations and tort liability, (2) both usually serve on administrative
committees, and (3) partners own some firm capital, while corporate
executives often share in profits by use of stock options in their
corporations.204 If the district court determines that certain partners are
analogous to corporate executives, law firms are likely to rethink the
operational structures of their firms or even to make an effort to distinguish
partners from corporate executives in partnership agreements.
The Sidley decision will also affect how partnerships and organizations run
their businesses,205 especially since the EEOC can now file employment
discrimination suits even when the victims waive their personal right to sue.206

200. See Winters, supra note 189, at 419.
201. See id. at 419–20.
202. “[A] broad reading of the term ‘employee’ [is] consistent with the statutory purpose of
ridding the Nation of [unlawful workplace] discrimination.” Clackamas Gastroenterology
Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 446 n.6 (2003).
203. See Are Partners Employees?, ILL. EMP. L. LETTER, Mar. 2003.
204. Id.
205. The Sidley decision will likely alter the entire litigation process with respect to the
employer/employee distinction. Following Sidley, it appears that a plaintiff will need to address
the issue of coverage under federal anti-discrimination laws from the outset of a case in situations
where a plaintiff is a partner, shareholder, or high-level executive. Plaintiffs should address
control issues in the early stages of discovery so plaintiffs are prepared to combat a motion to
dismiss or a motion for summary judgment, motions that will likely be filed by the opposition.
Crispin, supra note 30, at 8.
206. Joanna Grossman, Are Law Firm Partners “Employers” for Purposes of Discrimination
Law? A Federal Court of Appeals Suggests They May Not Be, FINDLAW, Dec. 17, 2002,
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/grossman/20021217.html.
The Supreme Court made the
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Partnerships now have to worry about both the EEOC and their own members
Ultimately, professional
filing employment discrimination suits.207
corporations and partnerships have to play by the rules, or else adverse action
taken against partners may be challenged under federal anti-discrimination
laws.208 In order to play by the rules, most firms will have to make some
major changes.
E.

Suggestions for the Problem

The increasingly corporate-style management that many large law firms
have adopted includes a greater risk that partners will be classified as
employees.209 There are, however, a few preemptive measures that firms can
take as a means of damage control. First, firms should consider the control test
in Clackamas when structuring their partnerships and executive committees.210
Second, firms should involve all partners in the decision-making of central
issues.211 Third, firms should allow all partners to vote on promotions,
demotions, and lateral hires.212 Fourth and finally, all partners should have a
voice in important issues such as allocation of shares and retirement.213 If
partnerships fail to take these precautions, they may end up paying for it in the
long run—literally.
F.

Putting It All Together

Law firms have changed. Firms have grown in size and in structure, and
many have even created several tiers of partnership.214 The majority of larger
firms, including Sidley, have centralized power structures and decision-making
is devolved on a small executive committee.215 The inevitable truth is that the
thirty-two demoted partners at Sidley were not true partners at all. In fact the
only true partners—the only employers—were the thirty-six powerful
attorneys that headed the executive committee.216 Sidley conducted only one
firm-wide vote in the past twenty-five years.217 Other than that, all major

determination as to the EEOC’s power to sue in Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v.
Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279 (2002). Id.
207. Grossman, supra note 206.
208. Olson & Mercer, supra note 2.
209. Paul F. Mickey Jr., Treat Your Partners Well, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 22, 2003, at 2.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Grossman, supra note 206.
215. Id.
216. See id.
217. Id.
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decisions were made or finalized by the executive committee.218 Further, in
Sidley, the thirty-two demoted partners lacked the pivotal privilege of
partnership: “co-equal control and power over the firm.”219 Under traditional
partnership law, there is a common understanding that decisions affecting the
firm will be made by the agreement of all partners.220 In partnerships, partners
are supposed to act upon the “joint opinion of all.”221 Sidley does not follow
the traditional tenets of partnership law. Since Sidley does not operate a
traditional partnership, it does not “deserve the immunities granted to [a]
traditional [partnership].”222
CONCLUSION
As large law firms continue to expand, the majority of partners appear
more like employees and less like employers.223 Without a clear statutory
definition of the term “employee” or definitive case law on the question, it is
difficult to make the employer/employee distinction. The best guidance is the
Clackamas decision, which applies the control test. The control test indicates
that law firm partners that do not possess substantial control, and decisionmaking power within their firm should be considered employees and should be
protected under the federal anti-discrimination statutes.
In the Sidley decision, the district court is likely to apply the Clackamas
control test. The court will likely conclude that the thirty-two demoted
partners were in fact employees due to their lack of control, voting rights, and
decision-making power. Ideally, the decision will shed some light on how to
make the employer/employee distinction. In the meantime, it may be prudent
for firms to err on the side of caution by assuming that all partners are
employees for the purposes of the federal anti-discrimination statutes.224
RACHEL M. MILAZZO

218. Id.
219. Grossman, supra note 206.
220. Id.
221. Hillman, supra note 188, at 797.
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